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 Abstract 
Groups strongly value loyalty, especially in the context of intergroup competition. However, 
research has yet to investigate how groups respond to members who leave the group or join a 
competing outgroup. Three studies investigated groups’ reactions to defectors (Experiment 1) 
and deserting members (Experiment 2 and 3). Experiment 1 used a minimal group paradigm 
to demonstrate that defectors trigger a stronger derogation of ingroup deviants than outgroup 
deviants vis-à-vis normative members. Experiments 2 and 3 compared group members’ 
responses to defection versus desertion from minimal and self-assigned groups respectively. 
Experiment 3 also explored an explanation for the evaluations of disloyalty. Across studies, 
participants evaluated loyal ingroup members more positively than defectors and deserters. 
Outgroup deserting and defecting members were evaluated similarly. Derogation of ingroup 
as compared to outgroup targets emerged only for defectors. In addition, Experiment 3 
demonstrated that negativity toward the outgroup was related to stronger derogation of 
disloyal targets. Negative outgroup attitudes trigger stricter criteria for responding to 
disloyalty. Directions for future research are discussed.  
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Why do individuals react so negatively to group members who leave their group in a 
competitive intergroup context? On December 2010, Domenico Scilipoti, a politician of the 
party Italy of Values granted his vote of confidence to Berlusconi’s opposing party. Later, 
Scilipoti crossed the floor. His actions proved decisive for the political equilibrium and 
allowed the opposing coalition to maintain power for two additional years. In 1999, Shaun 
Woodward, a member of the British Conservative party crossed the floor and switched 
toward the Labour party. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown greatly benefitted from 
Woodward’s first-hand knowledge of the Conservative party’s strategies. Interestingly, in 
both these episodes there followed waves of public indignation against the politicians. Such 
was the outrage against Scilipoti that a new term was coined from his surname, scilipotismo, 
to designate political transformation and party-switching. In a similar vein, and in spite of his 
contribution to the Labour party, Woodward met strong resistance and resentment on both 
sides of the political spectrum.  
These episodes suggest that individuals who are disloyal to their group may incur 
heavy social and material sanctions. But under what circumstances is disloyalty more 
consequential in the eyes of group members? Disloyalty may seem an obsolete concept in 
modern individualist, western cultures (Reichheld, 1996). These cultures promote and 
endorse values such as independence and authenticity (cf. Ditto & Mastronarde, 2009), 
flexibility and mobility in employment (e.g., Browning & McNamee, 2012), and change and 
constant personal improvement (cf. Rowley & Dawes, 2000). Nonetheless, from a group 
socialization perspective, disloyalty can have an important impact on group life (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998). At an intragroup level, parties, 
organizations, and groups more in general depend on their members’ loyalty in order to 
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of employee poaching (Sheldon & Li, 2013), and the best sports teams vie to attract the same 
stellar players. 
In spite of these dilemmas, and the importance of loyalty for competing groups, 
surprisingly few studies have investigated members’ reactions to individuals who leave the 
group (for examples see Bown & Abrams, 2003; Charlton & Bettencourt, 2001; Mannetti, 
Levine, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2010; Singer, Radloff, & Wark, 1963; cf. Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). The present research presents three studies investigating how individuals evaluate two 
types of disloyal members, defectors and deserters, in the context of intergroup competition. 
While desertion merely implies the loss of a member, defection occurs when a group member 
join a competing outgroup. These two forms of disloyalty have different implications at each 
level. Desertion may weaken the group but does not strengthen an outgroup, whereas 
defection may have both effects.  
Experiments 1 and 2 use a minimal group paradigm. Experiment 1 investigates how 
group members judge individuals who defect to join a competing outgroup. Experiment 2 
compares reactions to members who defect with reactions to those who only desert. Finally, 
Experiment 3 replicates results from Experiment 2 in the context of meaningful, self-assigned 
categories and explores a possible explanation for members’ appraisals of disloyalty. 
Group Socialization Model 
The Group Socialization Model (GSM) describes the relation between groups and 
individuals through four role transitions (entry, acceptance, divergence, and exit) crossed by 
five phases of group membership (investigation, socialization, maintenance, re-socialization, 
and remembrance) (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994). According to GSM, groups and 
individuals engage in a mutual process of evaluation for defining the respective levels of 
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point where a decision must be taken, a role transition occurs where the member may 
approach or move away from the group’s core positions.     
Frequently, members or groups need to cope with instances of abandonment or 
exclusion (cf. Levine et al., 1998). For instance, members may decide that the group does not 
adequately satisfy their individual needs/goals, or conversely, the group may deliberate that 
the individuals’ contribution is not sufficient to warrant membership (e.g., due to 
unproductivity) (Levine et al., 1998). 
Despite the ubiquity of exit from groups, judgments of ex-members remain one of the 
least studied phenomena in social psychology (cf. Mannetti et al., 2010). In the case of 
disloyal exit, several variables may affect groups’ reaction to the exiting member (Levine & 
Moreland, 2002). In addition, these reactions are likely to vary across different situations. In 
this paper, we focus on a situation in which group membership is mutually exclusive (i.e., 
individuals cannot belong to both groups at the same time; cf. Levine et al., 1998) and the 
group faces a decisive intergroup competition. As contended by Tajfel and Turner (1986, p. 
35; cf. also Levine & Moreland, 2002), these conditions increase conflict of interest between 
two groups thus making disloyalty particularly challenging.  
Social Identity, Subjective Group Dynamics and Group Loyalty 
 Social identity theory holds that group membership is an important component of the 
self-concept. When group membership is salient, individuals are not judged in terms of 
personal traits, but on the basis of their adherence to the group norms or prototype (Abrams, 
2012). Subjective Group Dynamics theory (SGD; e.g., Abrams, Marques, Randsley de 
Moura, Hutchison, & Bown, 2004; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001; Pinto, Marques, 
Levine, & Abrams, 2010; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013) further states that particular 
weight is placed on norms that prescribe how a group member should behave. Specifically, 
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prescriptive focus in judgments of deviants (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Taboada, 1998; Pinto 
et al., 2010). Ingroup deviants who break prescriptive norms are perceived to threaten the 
positive valence of the ingroup’s shared reality. Ingroup deviants are therefore derogated 
more than outgroup deviants, a phenomenon known as the black sheep effect (Marques, 
Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; see also Abrams et al., 2005; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, 
Robalo, & Rocha, 1992). 
A prescriptive norm particularly consequential for group members is loyalty (Zdaniuk 
& Levine, 2001).  In a competitive context, group loyalty may be conceptualized as a 
prescriptive oppositional norm (Abrams, 2011). The oppositional feature of loyalty refers to 
the fact that it implies opposite choices or preferences by members of the ingroup versus the 
outgroup (i.e., a group member cannot pledge allegiance to both groups simultaneously; 
Abrams, 2011; Abrams, et al., 2004; cf. Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).  
In the context of intergroup competition, loyalty is a highly valued norm because the 
group’s success often depends on whether its members show solidarity in the face of a 
challenge (Levine & Moreland, 2002). In the case of attitudes breaching the loyalty norm, an 
important implication is that ingroup members who violate the norm by endorsing outgroup’s 
attitudes may pose a challenge to the perceived positive valence of the ingroup (Marques et 
al., 1998). 
But what features trigger negative evaluations when disloyalty entails leaving the 
group? Is it relative potential gain for the outgroup that generates unfavorable evaluations of 
disloyal ingroup members, or is the potential loss to the ingroup alone sufficient to explain 
such reactions? While a group experiences the loss of a member both in the case of desertion 
and of defection, only defection implies a potential (material or symbolic) gain for the 
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members’ judgments of defectors (Experiment 1), and comparing those to evaluations of 
deserters (Experiments 2 and 3).  
Overview of the Studies and Hypotheses 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigate reactions to disloyal targets using a minimal 
group paradigm (MGP; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). An interesting feature of the 
MGP is that groups are novel and members do not interact with each other, so that they have 
no past history or interdependency among members. Testing group reactions to disloyalty in 
the context of minimal groups thus enables us to disentangle the impact of the nature of 
intergroup relations from the norms that might characterize pre-existing relationships among 
members and groups (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Previous research suggests that individuals 
value loyalty in ephemeral laboratory groups (Moreland & McMinn, 2009). However, no 
research to date has investigated individuals’ reaction to defection under minimal conditions. 
We predict that participants will prefer normative over defecting members. In addition, in 
keeping with literature on the black sheep effect (e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994), we predict 
greater derogation against ingroup defectors than outgroup defectors, showing that the 
implications for the ingroup are particularly relevant for judges of defectors.  
In Experiment 2 we examine reactions to either a deserter or defector. In both 
instances, a group suffers from an equivalent depletion of resources (i.e., the loss of a 
member). Nevertheless, compared with desertion, defection to a rival group more directly 
reduces the perceived value and distinctiveness of the leaver’s group relative to the outgroup 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Wetherell, & Reicher, 1987). This suggests that a member who 
defects to a competing outgroup should trigger harsher reactions than one who deserts the 
group but does not join a rival. Thus, we predict that derogation of ingroup defectors will be 
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In contrast to predictions for ingroup defectors, two different hypotheses might be 
advanced for outgroup defectors. On the one hand, the act of outgroup defection brings 
valuable resources to and also enhances the positive valence of the ingroup (Marques et al., 
1998; cf. also Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008). This would imply that outgroup 
defectors should be evaluated more positively than outgroup deserters (Marques et al., 1998). 
On the other hand, and in spite of the advantages they might bring to the ingroup, outgroup 
defectors may be regarded with suspicion. Indeed, outgroup defectors may generate distrust 
due to their violation of the loyalty norm (cf. Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). They may also 
impair the clarity of the intergroup boundaries (Turner et al., 1987). This line of argument 
suggests there might be weaker differentiation between deserting versus defecting deviant 
outgroup members than between deserting and defecting deviant ingroup members (Marques 
& Páez, 1994). These competing predictions are tested in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3 replicates Experiment 2 using a different setting to establish the 
generalizability of the findings. Specifically, Experiment 3 examines judgments of disloyal 
members using  self-assigned categories which are meaningful to participants. This 
methodological choice previously used in different contexts (see Shapiro, Boss, Salas, 
Tangirala, & Von Glinow, 2010; Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013) provides an opportunity to 
sample reactions to disloyalty across an array of different ingroup memberships. In addition, 
Experiment 3 directly investigates the role of prescriptive focus in judgments of deserting and 
defecting group members. 
Experiment 1  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Forty-five (42 female) university students participated in this experiment as a course 
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a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Target: normative, defector) mixed factorial design 
with repeated measures on the Target factor.  
Procedure and Materials 
 Participants were invited to take part in a study on ‘Perception Types and Internet 
Mediated Interaction’ through Qualtrics. Participants were asked to play the role of observers 
in an ongoing study, ostensibly to determine the link between perception style and 
performance on a logic task. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to 
compare how people with either of two different perception styles performed when solving 
cognitive problems (for a similar paradigm see Abrams, Randsley de Moura & Travaglino, 
2013, Study 3). 
Participants were assigned (randomly) to one of the two categories (i.e., 
spherical/squared viewers), supposedly on the basis of their choices on a series of pairs of 
paintings. Following the selection of paintings, participants read a brief description of the two 
thinking styles: ‘Recent studies have shown that people who are [Spherical/Squared viewers, 
randomized] are more prone to reflection. They like to analyze the details systematically 
before drawing conclusions. In contrast, people who are [Spherical/Squared viewers, 
respectively] type tend to be more spontaneous. They like to form global view of the events 
and to draw fast conclusions’. Subsequently, identification with the group was measured (5 
items; Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Retter, Gunnarsdottir, & Ando, 2009; α = .93).  
Next, participants observed a chat room of either ingroup or outgroup members, 
depending on condition. The task for the chat room was to solve a logic puzzle. Participants 
were told that the chat room was composed either of members of the Spherical or members of 
the Squared group (depending on Group condition). The chat room contained four members 
identified with a numerical label (e.g., Participant 23). Participants were asked to select two 
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experimental software depicted one of the selected members as a normative target and the 
other as a defector. The selection procedure for the two targets was intended to ensure that 
participants believed they had freely selected (and then evaluated) the disloyal target. 
Nevertheless, participants still observed all four members interacting in the chat-room.   
At the start of the observation session, participants were presented with the logic 
puzzle that the chat room members were trying to solve. This consisted of three mutually 
exclusive statements made by three fictional characters. The task for the members was to 
determine which statement was true. Care was taken that each of the four group members 
contributed approximately equally to the chat-room interaction (in terms of number of 
statements and average statement length).  
Toward the end of the interaction, while the group members were trying to solve the 
puzzle, the defector stated ‘I'm getting out of this chat room… I'm gonna (sic) work with 
[Competing Group - either Square or Spherical group ] in their chat room’. This was followed 
by a system-message (in red) stating ‘Participant XX has left the chat room. Participant XX 
has joined [Competing Group]’. The normative target, in contrast, expressed their willingness 
to remain in the group ‘Ok... let's go ahead with the challenge here! I am staying anyway’. 
Next, participants read another system-message stating that the allotted observation time was 
over and were asked to complete the dependent measures. After the dependent measures, and 
before the debriefing, participants were asked if they wished to express any comment on the 
study (using a textbox). Moreover, participants were provided with the email addresses of the 
researchers to ask questions. No comments were offered  by participants, and participants did 
not contact the researchers. 
Evaluations. Participants were asked to reflect on the chat room session and give 
their opinions about the other participants that they had selected. Similarly to previous 











EVALUATIONS OF GROUP DESERTERS AND DEFECTORS                                       11 
 
likeable, nice, generous, loyal and mean spirited, rude, devious, and selfish (reversed items) 
each target was, using 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). These specific items were 
selected because they tapped non-specific evaluative traits, suitable for expressing appraisal 
of both ingroup and outgroup targets (cf. Marques et al., 1988).  These items formed a 
reliable scale for both the judgments of the defector (α = .89) and the normative target (α = 
.90).1 
Results and Discussion 
 Evaluations were analyzed with a 2 (Group) x 2 (Target) ANOVA with repeated 
measure on the Target factor. There was no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 43) = 1.43, 
p = .23, η2 = .03. There was a significant effect of Target, F (1, 43) = 56.81, p < .001, η2 = 
.57, and a significant Group x Target interaction, F (1, 43) = 10.69, p = .001, η2 = .21. 
Consistent with the black sheep effect, the simple effects of Target within Group showed 
much stronger differentiation among ingroup targets, F (1, 43) = 75.08, p < .001, η2 = .64, 
than among outgroup targets, F (1, 43) = 7.05, p = .01, η2 = .14. Moreover, the simple effects 
of Group within Target showed that while the ingroup normative target was evaluated more 
positively than the outgroup normative target, F (1, 43) = 12.97, p = .001, η2 = .23, the 
ingroup defector was evaluated more negatively than the outgroup defector, F (1, 43) = 4.20, 
p = .047, η2 = .09 (see Table 1). Thus, under these minimal conditions, participants were 
more negative toward defectors than normative members from both groups. However, in line 
with SGD theory, they showed substantially less favorable evaluations of the ingroup 
defector than the outgroup defector. Interestingly, despite of the fact that the outgroup 
defector was strengthening the ingroup’s position, the outgroup defector was evaluated less 
positively than their normative counterpart. This suggests that individuals value loyalty per se 
(regardless of the target's group membership) and are inclined to derogate individuals from 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to extend and explore our understanding of group 
reactions to ingroup disloyal members. An important limitation of Experiment 1 was that it 
did not distinguish defecting (joining an outgroup) from merely leaving the ingroup. We 
addressed this issue in Experiment 2. If individuals are mainly concerned with the potential 
weakening of the ingroup caused by loss of an ingroup member, both types of disloyalty 
should attract a similar evaluation. If, however, it is the nature of intergroup relations 
(Abrams, 2013; Dovidio, 2013; Hogg & Terry, 2000) – and the potential consequences of 
strengthening an outgroup by joining the opposite ranks – that matters, ingroup defectors 
should trigger more unfavorable evaluations than ingroup deserters. We test these alternative 
possibilities in the present study.  
In contrast, outgroup defectors may either be perceived as (symbolically and 
materially) enhancing the positive valence of the ingroup or as generating distrust due to the 
violation of the norm of loyalty. In turn, this might lead to two different predictions. On the 
one hand, they might be evaluated more favorably than outgroup deserters (cf. Marques et al., 
1998). On the other, we may expect less differentiation between outgroup disloyal targets 
compared to ingroup disloyal targets because the different types of outgroup disloyalty have 
less distinct implications for the ingroup. We examine reactions to outgroup disloyal targets 
in Experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 One-hundred participants (29 females) from India were recruited through Amazon’s 
MTurk (Mage = 30.10, SD = 7.95) and were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (Group: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Motive: desertion vs. defection) x 2 (Target: normative, disloyal) 
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Procedure and Materials 
To test our hypotheses, we modified the procedure used in Experiment 1. Participants 
were invited to participate in a study about ‘the relation between thinking style and group 
decision making’ via Amazon’s MTurk on Qualtrics. Participants were instructed to play the 
role of observers in an ongoing study aimed at determining the effectiveness of decision-
making processes among different thinking styles. They were informed that recent advances 
in psychology had determined the existence of two thinking styles. The two styles were 
described as being equally distributed in the population, and across genders, and equally 
effective at solving cognitive problems at the individual level. Participants were informed 
that this study was designed to determine how the two styles performed at the group level. 
Participants were assigned (randomly) to one of two categories (i.e., Inductive 
Thinkers/Deductive Thinkers), allegedly on the basis of their performance on a brief 
cognitive test. This test included seven items (1 =  Not at All Like Me, 5 =  Completely Like 
Me) taken from the Thinking Style Inventory (e.g., I like to draw or doodle) and two graphic 
items from the Stencil Task. Following the test, participants were told they belonged to one of 
the two styles and read a brief description of the profiles: ‘Inductive thinkers prefer to inspect 
single facts before drawing general conclusions about social and material phenomena. 
Inductive thinkers approach new information carefully and systematically before making a 
decision. In contrast, Deductive Thinkers form a general picture of the events which inform 
their subsequent analysis of single episodes. Deductive Thinkers approach information in a 
scattered way and do not linger on particulars and details’. To check that participants valued 
their group membership, we measured identification with the group using three items (cf. 
Randsley de Moura et al., 2009, α = .89). 
Participants were then ‘randomly’ assigned to a chat room (in actuality, always chat 
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outgroup (according to the condition), each member signified with a numerical label. In order 
to increase the plausibility of our manipulation of exit, while participants were ‘waiting’ to 
join the chat-room, they were shown instructions ostensibly given to members of the chat 
room. They read: ‘These were the instructions shown to chat room participants. “You have 
volunteered to join a chat room of a group of people who share your thinking style. You will 
be asked to complete a series of games (tasks) and the chat room must arrive at a group 
solution for each one. The procedures for this research require us to make you aware that 
your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time, or to choose another 
chat room. Please enter the chat room when instructed to do so”’.  
Given that this study was conducted on Amazon’s Mturk and in order to engage 
participants’ attention, we followed suggestions from Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 
(2009). Specifically, we randomly presented participants with fictitious information about 
results from previous games concerning that chat room. Participants read that other matches 
had been already completed between chat room G (the one they were assigned to) and chat 
room E (another chat room), and were informed about the results. Later (before the 
manipulation of exit), participants were asked questions about these details. Participants who 
answered incorrectly were warned and reminded of the correct information. According to 
Oppenheimer et al. (2009) these procedures should increase the likelihood that participants 
read instructions more accurately.  
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to select two of the four members of the 
chat room upon which to focus their attention. One of the two members selected was the 
normative target, the other the disloyal target. Note that regardless of their selection 
participants observed all the four members interacting.  
Participants were presented with the same logic puzzle used in Study 1. Care was 
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equally to the chat room interaction, proposing a (normative) solution to the logic puzzle. 
Toward the end, while the group members were trying to solve the puzzle, the disloyal target 
stated a desire to leave the chat room. This was followed by a system-message (in red) stating 
that the target had either joined the respective outgroup (defector condition) or merely left the 
chat-room (deserter condition). In contrast, the normative target expressed a desire to remain 
in the chat room. Finally participants read another system-message stating that the allotted 
observation time was over (see supplemental material). They were asked to complete the 
dependent measures, and finally a manipulation check. Participants were debriefed in writing 
and compensated for their time.  
Evaluations. Participants completed the same scale as in Study 1, using 7-point 
Likert scales (8 items, 4 reversed). The fourth item (To what extent do you think [target] is 
mean-spirited) lowered the reliability of the scale by more than .10, and is thus excluded from 
the following analyses. The remaining 7 items formed a reliable scale for both the normative 
(α = .82) and disloyal target (α = .72) and were averaged together. 
Manipulation Check. Participants were asked ‘To what extent do you think [disloyal 
target] has left the group to join [the outgroup]’.  
Results and Discussion 
The engagement check presented randomly information about the previous matches in 
the chat room. To ensure that this information did not affect our results we dummy-coded the 
different variants and included this variable as a covariate. No effect of the engagement check 
was found. Twenty-five people failed the manipulation check and were excluded from the 
following analyses, leaving a final sample of N = 752. Individuals were excluded if they 
failed to report whether the disloyal target was defecting (i.e., answered less than the scale 
midpoint on the manipulation check item) in the defector condition or merely deserting 
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Evaluations 
A 2 (Group) x 2 (Motive) x 2 (Target) ANOVA with repeated measures on the Target 
factor revealed a significant main effect of Target, F (1, 73) = 165.83, p < .001, η2 = .70. 
Normative targets (M = 5.47, SE = .11) were evaluated more positively than disloyal targets 
(M = 3.64, SE = .10). The main effects of Motive F (1, 73) = 2.74, p = .10, η2 = .04 and 
Group, F (1, 73) = 1.01, p = .32, η2 = .01 were not significant, nor was their interaction, F (1, 
73) = .14, p = .71, η2 = .002.  
There was a marginal Target x Group interaction, F (1, 73) = 3.10, p = .08, η2 = .04. 
These effects were further qualified by a significant Target x Motive x Group interaction, F 
(1, 73) = 11.04, p = .001, η2 = .13. To probe our hypotheses, we tested whether ingroup 
defectors triggered the black sheep effect and whether they attracted harsher evaluations 
compared to ingroup deserters.  
 The simple effects of Group within Target and Motive showed that in the defector 
condition the normative ingroup target was evaluated significantly more positively than the 
normative outgroup target, F (1, 73) = 8.18, p = .006, η2 = .10. The ingroup defector was 
evaluated significantly less positively than the outgroup defector, F (1, 73) = 5.08, p = .027, 
η2 = .07. These comparisons were not significant in the deserter condition, Fs (1, 73) < 2.06, 
p > .16, ηs2 < .03. 
An inspection of the simple effects of Motive within Target and Group showed that 
ingroup defectors were evaluated significantly less positively than ingroup deserters, F (1, 
73) = 6.08, p = .016, η2 = .07. In contrast, participants did not differentiate between outgroup 
defectors and deserters, F (1, 73) = 1.28, p = .26, η2 = .02. However, the outgroup normative 
target was evaluated significantly less positively in the defector condition compared to the 
deserter condition, F (1, 73) = 6.12, p = .02, η2 = .08. This comparison was not significant for 
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Results from this experiment replicate and extend results from Experiment 1. 
Regardless of the group, normative targets were evaluated more positively than disloyal 
targets. Ingroup defectors were evaluated less positively than outgroup defectors and ingroup 
deserters, suggesting that they trigger stronger derogation compared to other disloyal targets. 
Outgroup defectors and deserters were not evaluated differently from each other. In keeping 
with SGD, individuals distinguished between types of ingroup disloyalty in a way that 
preserved the positive valence of their group image, but did not distinguish between types of 
outgroup disloyalty.  
Experiment 3  
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate and extend Experiments 1 and 2. First, we 
investigated whether our findings would generalize in the context of categories meaningful to 
participants. Furthermore, Experiment 3 examines the assumption that evaluations of disloyal 
targets reflect judgments of whether they are breaching an important norm, and we test 
whether this perception underlies the derogation of disloyal members.  
To address the generalizability of previous findings, we compared reactions to 
defectors and deserters in the context of meaningful, self-assigned categories. In keeping with 
previous research that has used a similar methodology (Shapiro, et al., 2010; Waytz, et al., 
2013), we tested our hypothesis that ingroup defectors trigger the black sheep more strongly 
than deserters using a fictitious scenario and authentic categories to which participants 
actually belonged. 
Moreover, we empirically tested the assumption that disloyal targets from both groups 
were perceived as breaking a prescriptive norm of the group. Group loyalty is a powerful 
norm because it has two bases. First, it is a strong oppositional norm because members of a 
particular group should be loyal to that group but not to opposing or contrasting groups. In 
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or society) in the sense that loyalty per se may be an important social value (Abrams & 
Rutland, 2008; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). For example, to some extent, disloyalty suggests 
untrustworthiness. Therefore, it might invite negative evaluations no matter who the disloyal 
person is. This may explain why, in Experiment 1 and 2, both ingroup and outgroup disloyal 
members were regarded negatively. However, in line with SGD, and consistent with previous 
studies, loyalty norms should be applied particularly strongly to ingroup members. Indeed, 
based on realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) members should value loyalty 
especially strongly in the context of intergroup competition (see Dovidio, 2013; Levine et al., 
1998). This ‘prescriptive focus’ related with the endorsement of loyalty norms, is therefore 
examined in Experiment 3. 
In addition, we investigate a potential motivation for evaluations of disloyal targets. 
Under circumstances of intense conflict of interests between groups, individuals tend to 
perceive the outgroup more negatively (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; see also Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), due to perceived threat (e.g., Langford & Ponting, 1992). Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that negative outgroup attitudes are an important indicator of perceived 
intergroup threat (Riek, et al., 2006). It follows that participants with more negative outgroup 
attitudes may be more attuned to breaches of loyalty norms because disloyalty may have 
implications for the attainment of the group's goals and for sustaining a positive image (cf. 
Levine & Moreland, 2002). Thus, given the context of intergroup competition, we expect that 
participants who express more negative views of the outgroup will also perceive disloyalty 
more negatively (also when controlling for ingroup attitudes).    
Another correlate of intergroup competition is the tightening of standards for defining 
transgressions (cf. Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). Groups experiencing external threat (as in the 
case of intergroup competition) adopt more stringent criteria for defining the boundary of 
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'social reactions' approach to deviance, these effects reflect a sharpening of focus on norms 
('prescriptive focus'), which in turn relate to more negative reactions against deviants 
(Burnstein & McRae, 1962; Lauderdale, 1976; Lauderdale, Smith-Cunnien, Parker, & 
Inverarity, 1984; cf. Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Disloyalty should invoke a prescriptive focus. 
Therefore we expect that the link between outgroup negativity and evaluations of disloyalty 
should be mediated by prescriptive focus. By using self-assigned categories which are 
meaningful to participants we are able to measure pre-existing outgroup attitudes and 
investigate their effect on evaluations of disloyal targets in an imagined scenario. 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
Eighty participants (44 female) from the USA were recruited via MTurk (Mage =  
32.14, SD = 12.45), with random assignment to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. 
outgroup) x 2 (Motive: desertion vs. defection) x 2 (Target: normative, disloyal) mixed 
factorial design with repeated measures on the Target factor.  
Procedure and Materials 
Data were collected through Qualtrics and Amazon’s MTurk. Participants were asked 
to name a group to which they belonged and its long-term main rival (cf. Shapiro, et al., 
2010; Waytz, et al., 2013). Consistent with the previous experiments, we were interested in 
testing reactions to disloyalty in the context of intergroup competition and mutually exclusive 
membership. To hold the nature of intergroup relations constant, and at the same time allow 
for a wide array of participant ingroups, we provided participants with the following 
instructions: ‘Please think about a group of which you are a member and which you care 
about. This should be a group you have belonged to for some time. This should also be a 
group that has to compete with other groups to gain recognition, status, resources, or 
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Participants were then asked to write some reasons about why they enjoyed being part of the 
ingroup. Subsequently, participants imagined two targets for each group and wrote down 
their initials. Qualtrics automatically substituted the groups’ names and the targets’ initials 
throughout the study.  
At this point identification with the group (5 items as in Experiment 1; α = .93), and 
attitudes towards the ingroup and the outgroup were measured using a 7-point scales (1 = 
Very Unfavorable, 7 = Very Favorable). Next, participants were asked to imagine that their 
group was in the final decisive stage of the competition and was preparing to meet its main 
rival. As a check that participants were imagining of a plausible form of competition, they 
were asked to describe the kind of competition they were thinking of. 
Next, participants read a scenario in which one of the targets (ingroup or outgroup) 
left the group, either without specifying any motivation (desertion) or to join the competing 
outgroup (defection). The other target was described as remaining normative and staying with 
the group. Specifically, participants read: “[Ingroup] is about to meet [Outgroup] in a 
decisive challenge. The result of the whole competition depends on the outcome of this 
challenge. If the team loses, its future prospects will be seriously damaged. On the other 
hand, a victory will greatly increase the group's prospects of long term success. There are few 
weeks remaining to meet this challenge and the whole group is preparing to the best of its 
ability. There is an air of great excitement and tension. Some days before this decisive 
challenge, [disloyal target] communicates to the rest of the group, including you, that 
[disloyal targets] has decided to leave the group. [In the defector condition participants read 
‘and accept a position in the competing group, [Outgroup]. [Disloyal target] leaves the group 
and joins [Outgroup]]”.  Both in the defector and deserter conditions, participants read 
“[Normative Target] remains in the group and continues to participate with the others in the 
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After reading the scenario, participants completed the dependent measures, were 
compensated and debriefed in writing. Note that both the type of challenge and the potential 
resource depletion for the group do not differ in the desertion and defection scenarios. 
Prescriptive focus. Participants rated to what extent each target was ‘breaking the 
rules of the situation’. This question, answered using a 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely), was intended to detect whether participants understood that the target had 
broken a prescriptive norm of loyalty, and hence whether participants were focusing on that 
norm.  
Evaluations. Participants used the same item as in Experiment 1 and 2. Items were 
averaged to form reliable scales for the disloyal (α = .95) and the normative (α = .93) target. 
Manipulation check.  Participants were asked ‘To what extent do you think [disloyal 
target] has left the group to join [the outgroup]’ 
Results and Discussion 
Seven participants failed the manipulation check (i.e., answered less than the scale 
midpoint on the manipulation check item in the defector condition, or answered more than 
the scale midpoint in the deserting condition) and were excluded from the analyses. Two 
scores on Evaluations and one on Prescriptive Focus were outliers at more than 2.5 SD from 
the mean and were deleted. An inspection of the groups named revealed that 27.4 % of 
participants selected sport groups (e.g., Eagles vs. Celtics), 28.8% selected leisure-related 
associations (e.g., competing books club, or gaming clubs), 20.5% selected a political group 
(e.g., Democrats vs. Republicans), and 23.3% selected an organization (competing 
companies, and universities).3 Further, we examined the type of competitions indicated by the 
participants. In keeping with the type of group, participants described different types of 
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variables were analysed using a 2 (Group) x 2 (Motive) x 2 (Target) ANOVA, with repeated 
measure on the Target factor.  
Evaluations 
There was a significant effect of Group, F (1, 67) = 5.91, p = .02, η2 = .10. Overall, 
ingroup targets (M = 5.01, SE = .16) were evaluated more positively than outgroup targets (M 
= 4.45, SE = .16). There was a significant main effect of Target, F (1, 67) = 46.61, p < .001, 
η2 = .41. Normative targets (M = 5.29, SE = .12) were evaluated more positively than disloyal 
targets (M = 4.18, SE = .16). There was no main effect of Motive, F (1, 67) = .09, p > .10, η2 
= .001. All the two-way interactions were significant, Fs (1, 67) > 5.64, ps < .01, ηs2 >.09. 
These were further moderated by a significant Target x Group x Motive interaction, F (1, 67) 
= 5.77, p = .015, η2 = .09. 
The simple effects of Group within Target and Motive showed that ingroup normative 
targets were evaluated more positively than outgroup normative targets, Fs (1, 67) > 14.98, 
ps < .001, ηs2 > .24. Replicating results from Experiment 2, and in line with the black sheep 
effect, the ingroup defector was evaluated more negatively than the outgroup defector, F (1, 
67) = 8.83, p = .004, η2 = .11. However, ingroup and outgroup deserters were evaluated 
similarly, F (1, 67) = 1.77, p = .19, η2 = .03. 
As predicted, the simple effect of Motive within Group and Target, was only 
significant for the ingroup disloyal target, F (1, 67) = 10.73, p = .002, η2 = .14. This target 
was evaluated more negatively when defecting than when deserting. All other simple effects 
were non-significant, Fs  < 2.38, ps > .13 (see Table 3). 
Prescriptive Focus 
 There was a significant effect of Target, F (1, 68) = 48.52, p < .001, η2 = .42. Not 
surprisingly, disloyal targets were perceived as breaking the rules more than normative 
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The effect of Group x Motive was marginally significant, F (1, 68) = 8.23, p = .07, η2 = .05. 
There was a significant Target x Group interaction, F (1, 68) = 5.06, p = .03, η2 = .07. 
Ingroup normative targets (M = 1.58, SE = .22) were judged to have broken the rules less 
than outgroup normative targets (M = 2.23, SE = .21), F (1, 68) = 4.58, p = .04, η2 = .06. The 
difference between ingroup and outgroup disloyal targets was, as expected, non-significant 
(M = 4.05, SE = .31 and M = 3.49, SE = .29, respectively for ingroup and outgroup), F (1, 68) 
= 1.68, p = .20, η2 = .02. In addition, there was a significant Target x Motive interaction, F (1, 
68) = 18.93, p = .008, η2 = .10. Across groups, defectors (M = 4.24, SE = .30) invoked a 
stronger prescriptive focus compared to deserters (M = 3.31, SE = .30), F (1, 68) = 15.54, p = 
.03, η2 = .07. The difference between normative targets in the two conditions (M = 1.64, SE = 
.33 and M = 2.17, SE = .21 respectively) was non-significant, F (1, 68) = 2.96, p = .09, η2 = 
.04. Consistent with the idea that group loyalty is a strong prescriptive norm, Group did not 
further moderate this interaction, F (1, 68) = 2.08, p = .37, η2 = .01.   
 Mediated Moderation Model 
In order to test the hypothesis that negative attitude towards the outgroup impacted on 
judgments of deviants because of heightened prescriptive focus, Prescriptive Focus (PF) was 
entered as mediator of the relationship between feelings of unfavorability toward the 
outgroup and evaluations of disloyal targets. This process should account for evaluations of 
both deserters and defectors, since it is the extent to which the deviant is perceived as having 
broken the rules that should mediate between outgroup unfavorability and evaluations of 
disloyal targets. However, due to the fact that PF should be applied more strongly to ingroup 
members, we added Group as moderator of the path between PF and evaluations of disloyal 
targets. The analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro with 5000 bootstraps 
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The joint effect of PF, Group, and feelings of unfavorability toward the outgroup on 
evaluations of disloyal targets was significant, F (6, 64) =10.28, p < .001. The whole model 
accounted for 49% of the variance. Feelings of unfavorability toward the outgroup were 
significantly negatively related to PF, b = -.35, SE = .12, t = -2.82, p = .006. In other words, 
those who felt more negative toward the outgroup also were more attuned to the prescriptive 
loyalty norms. 
Evaluations of disloyal targets were significantly affected by PF, b = -1.03, SE = .21, 
t = -4.78, p < .001. There was no direct effect of feelings of unfavorability toward the 
outgroup, b = .06, SE = .08, t = .73, p = .47 and no significant effect of Group, b = -.98, SE = 
.57, t = -1.72, p = .08. The interaction between Group x PF was significant, b = -.42, SE = 
.13, t = 3.13, p = .002. An inspection of the conditional indirect effect showed that there was 
a larger effect of PF for the ingroup, b =  .21, SE = .09, 95CI = .07 to .41, compared to the 
outgroup b =  .07, SE = .05, 95CI = .002 to .19.  
General Discussion 
These studies investigated how individuals evaluate group members who leave their 
group in a competitive intergroup context. We hypothesized that although individuals would 
prefer normative over disloyal targets, the effect would be stronger for ingroup members than 
for outgroup members. In addition, we predicted that defection (i.e., joining a competing 
outgroup) rather than desertion (i.e., merely leaving the group) would trigger more extreme 
judgments of ingroup versus outgroup targets. Across three studies, involving participants 
from three countries, several types of group membership, and two different paradigms, results 
supported our hypotheses.    
Experiment 1 showed that while ingroup normative members were evaluated more 
positively than outgroup normative members, the reverse applied to evaluations of defectors. 
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in the context of a MGP, showing the importance people may attach to applying the loyalty 
norm to ingroup members (Abrams et al., 2004; Levine & Moreland, 2002). 
Experiment 2 extended those results showing that the black sheep effect emerged only 
for ingroup defectors but not deserters. In the context of a MGP, ingroup defectors were 
evaluated less positively than ingroup deserters, and the latter were not differentiated from 
outgroup deserters. This suggests that unfavorable evaluations are not necessarily directed at 
people who leave the ingroup, but may be reserved for those who directly blur the boundaries 
between groups (cf. Brewer & Silver, 2000). In Experiment 2 the outgroup normative target 
was evaluated more positively when paired with a deserter than when paired with a defector. 
This result was unexpected, tangential to our key hypothesis, and was not replicated in 
Experiment 3. A possibility is that in the context in which the Experiment 2 took place 
(India) the presence of a defector triggers a more negative appraisal of the outgroup. It 
remains a task for future research to further explore evaluations of normative targets across 
different contexts. 
Experiment 3 replicated results from Experiments 1 and 2 in the context of self-
assigned categories. Experiment 3 also investigated a possible explanation for the evaluations 
of disloyalty. Specifically, individuals who held more negative outgroup attitudes also 
perceived disloyalty more negatively (cf. Levine & Moreland, 2002). Consistent with the 
‘social reaction’ approach to deviance literature (e.g., Lauderdale et al., 1984), this linkage 
was attributable to the application of a stronger prescriptive focus. Furthermore, while this 
process accounted for evaluations of both ingroup and outgroup disloyal targets, it was more 
pronounced towards ingroup members.  
The findings are also consistent with the idea that intergroup competition sharpens a 
prescriptive focus, and it is this focus that determines the evaluative reactions to individuals 
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between intragroup relations and intergroup processes (cf. Abrams, 2013; Dovidio, 2013). 
However, to understand whether competition per se or specifically ingroup-outgroup 
competition is sufficient to have these effects, a task for future research is to investigate 
whether defectors are negatively evaluated if they join a non-competitive outgroup. Future 
research should also focus upon differences in the psychological correlates for evaluations of 
defectors and deserters.  
Another interesting feature of these studies is the analysis of evaluations of outgroup 
defectors. Across studies the outgroup defectors were joining the ingroup, but they were not 
evaluated particularly favorably. In Experiment 1 and 2, they were evaluated less positively 
than outgroup normative members. In Experiment 3, they were neither differentiated from an 
outgroup normative target nor from a deserter. Perhaps outgroup defectors are initially 
regarded with suspicion (due to their disloyalty) and with caution, owing to their negative 
impact on the clarity of intergroup boundaries (e.g., Turner et al., 1987). Indeed, when the 
UK Conservative MP Woodward crossed the floor and joined the Labour, in spite of the 
benefits the Labour party gained from his defection, he was sharply criticized by members of 
both parties on the ground that his actions would negatively impact on the general public’s 
perception of politics. These observations are consistent with the idea that individuals who 
have newly defected to join the ingroup from the outgroup undergo a phase of marginality 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994) during which it becomes particularly important to show 
allegiances to the ingroup (Moreland, 1985) before they are fully accepted. 
Across experiments, participants' identification with the ingroup did not moderate the 
findings (see Note 1). This might seem surprising because stronger identification with the 
ingroup could be expected to relate to more negative evaluations of disloyal targets (cf. 
Levine & Moreland, 2002). Identification may have been at sufficient levels that variation did 
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concern not to strengthen the outgroup, rather than exclusive concern with the ingroup, was 
important in these experiments. Ingroup defectors, but not deserters, caused the emergence of 
the black sheep effect. In addition, in Experiment 3, which used groups that mattered to 
participants, outgroup but not ingroup attitudes predicted evaluations of disloyal targets from 
both groups (see Note 4). Nonetheless, there are situations in which ingroup identification 
moderates individuals’ assessment of attitudinal disloyalty (Abrams & Rutland, 2008) and 
therefore future research needs to address whether it can affect assessment of behavioral 
desertion and defection. 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
This series of experiments is the first to investigate people’s reactions to individuals 
who leave their groups for different reasons in a competitive intergroup context. While 
disloyal targets were derogated across groups, the key finding is that ingroup defectors are 
subject to particularly strong derogation. In line with SGD and the black sheep effect, ingroup 
defectors are evaluated more negatively than ingroup deserters and outgroup defectors.  
Questions of loyalty and disloyalty represent an inherently rich and complex set of 
problems for groups. This series of studies open the way to a set of interesting research 
questions. In particular, future research should investigate the different elements that may 
influence group members’ reactions to disloyal targets.  
Many factors at different levels of analysis are likely to influence reactions to 
disloyalty (cf. Levine & Moreland, 2002). Specifically, characteristics of the disloyal target, 
and of the context are likely to play a role in how group members react to deviants. All things 
being equal, groups are highly motivated to retain those members that contribute more the 
group success and thus express harsher reactions against those who take the decision to leave 
(Levine et al., 1998). In addition, the centrality of the member is also likely to play a role in 
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trigger most extreme evaluations (Pinto et al., 2010). Centrality and quantity of contribution 
may interact in interesting ways, so that marginal but high-contribution members may spark 
greater group ire than central, but low-contribution members who leave the group (cf. 
Ellemers & Jetten, 2012). Moreover, the degree of perceived intergroup threat also might 
moderate individuals’ appraisal of disloyal targets. Breaches of the loyalty norm may be 
perceived more negatively when the positive ingroup distinctiveness is threatened. 
Conversely, a non threatening context might mitigate the appraisal of disloyalty. The 
development and origins of reactions to disloyalty are also of interest (Abrams, 2011b; 
Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams, et al., 2008). 
Finally, future research might investigate the effect of desertion and defection on 
groups. As contended by Levine and Moreland (1985), ex-members may still influence the 
course of action of a group as group members engage in the remembrance phase. For 
instance, evaluations of current members may change as a function of when/why other 
members left. A group may adopt either more lenient or stringent criteria to incorporate 
newcomers (cf. Moreland & McMinn, 2009). In addition, deserters and defectors may impact 
differently on individuals’ and groups’ need for optimal distinctiveness (Brewer & Silver, 
2000).  To conclude, our findings suggest that in both real and minimal groups people 
strongly value loyalty. Consequently, groups may be more inclined to derogate those who 
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     1Across studies, we measured identification with the ingroup. In all the studies, the mean 
level of identification was significantly higher than the scale midpoint (4), MStudy 1 = 5.02, 
SEStudy 1 = 0.14, tStudy 1 (43) = 7.10, pStudy 1 < .001, η2Study 1 = .54, MStudy 2 = 5.44, SEStudy 2 = .14, 
tStudy 2(78) = 10.28, pStudy 2 <  .001, η2Study 2 = .57, and MStudy 3 = 6.24, SEStudy 3 = 0.10, tStudy 3 (79) 
= 23.04, pStudy 3 < .001, η2Study 3 = .87, respectively. However, across studies no main effects or 
significant interactions involving identification were detected and because this measure was 
not affected by conditions, identification is not discussed further. 
     2To check that the failure on the manipulation check was independent from conditions, chi-
square tests of independence were performed to examine the relation between the excluded 
cases and Group, and excluded cases and Motive. In both cases, the relation between these 
variables was not significant (χ2(1, N = 100) = 1.70, p = .36 and χ2(1, N = 100) = 1.59, p = 
.25, respectively) showing that exclusion was not systematically related to conditions.  
     3To test whether the type of group named affected the results, we dummy coded the four-
level variable and added the set of dummies as covariates in the repeated measure ANOVA 
on evaluations, prescriptive focus and in the test of conditional indirect effect. The general 
pattern of results presented here is not affected (and sometimes even strengthen) when the 
dummy variables are added to the analyses. More details about these analyses are available at 
request by the first author.  
     4Individuals significantly favored the ingroup (M = 6.40, SD = .98) over the outgroup (M 
= 3.36, SD = 1.81), t(72) = 12.80, p < .001. To test whether ingroup attitude had an impact on 
evaluations of the defectors over and beyond outgroup attitudes, the variables were 
simultaneously entered as predictors in a multiple regressions model. Only attitudes towards 
the outgroup significantly predicted Evaluations, β = .34, p = .004, while attitude towards the 
ingroup were not significant related, β = .10, p = .37.  The two variables together explained 
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Table 1. Effects of Group Membership on Evaluations of Normative and Disloyal Group 
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Table 2. Effects of Group Membership, and Motive on Evaluations of Normative and 
Disloyal Group Members (SE in parentheses). 
  
Measure Group Ingroup Outgroup 
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Table 3. Effects of Group Membership, and Motive on Evaluations and Prescriptive Focus of 
Normative and Disloyal Group Members (SE in parentheses). 
  
Measure Group Ingroup Outgroup 
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Figure 1. 
Experiment 3: Mediated moderation model showing coefficients for the indirect effect of Feelings of Unfavorability toward the Outgroup on 
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x The paper tests how people react to disloyal ingroup and outgroup members 
x Compared to ingroup deserters, only ingroup defectors trigger a black sheep effect 
x Reactions to disloyalty are explained by a focus on prescriptive norms  
x Negative attitudes toward the outgroup motivate prescriptive focus on disloyalty 
